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A B S T R A C T
We investigate whether securities commission oversight reduces the complexity of financial reporting (com-
plexity). To measure the securities commission oversight, we use comment letters from securities commis-
sion of Iran. Further, to measure the complexity, we employ the Fog index. Using a difference-in-differences
design with a propensity score matching approach, we find that the securities commission oversight reduces
the complexity. Furthermore, we document that the impact of securities commission oversight on the com-
plexity is stronger for firms with higher corporate governance quality. In addition, we document that the
impact of securities commission oversight on the complexity (1) is not limited to one year and persists
through at least two years later; and (2) is not higher for firms that receive more comment letters. We fur-
ther document the spillover effect of securities commission oversight, in the sense that firms not receiving
any comment letter reduce their complexity if the securities commission has commented on the industry
leader or a close rival. Collectively, this paper, on the one hand, provides related evidence for the interna-
tional debate on whether securities commissions could provide beneficial effects; and on the other hand,
contributes to the literature on the complexity and its reducing factors that are among the most important
issues in the context of international financial reporting.
©2020 ASEPUC. Published by EDITUM - Universidad de Murcia. This is an open access article under the
CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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R E S U M E N
En este trabajo se investiga si la supervisión de la Comisión de Valores reduce la complejidad de los
informes financieros. Para ello se utilizan las cartas de opinión de la Comisión de Valores de Irán. Además,
para medir dicha complejidad, se emplea el índice de Fog. Usando un diseño de diferencia en diferencias
con la aproximación propensity score matching, se encuentra que la supervisión de la Comisión de Valores
reduce esta complejidad. Además, se muestra que el impacto de la supervisión de las comisiones de valores
en la complejidad de los informes financieros es mayor para las empresas con mayor calidad de gobierno
corporativo. También se documenta que este impacto (1) no se limita a un año y persiste al menos dos
años después, y (2) no es mayor para las empresas que reciben más cartas de opinión. Además, se constata
el efecto indirecto de la supervisión de la comisión de valores, en el sentido de que las empresas que
no reciben ninguna carta de opinión reducen la complejidad de sus informes financieros si la comisión
de valores ha hecho comentarios sobre la empresa líder del sector o sobre un competidor cercano. En
definitiva, este artículo proporciona, por un lado, evidencia relacionada con el debate internacional sobre
si las comisiones de valores podrían tener efectos beneficiosos en la información financiera que elaboran
las empresas y, por otro, contribuye a la literatura sobre la complejidad de los informes financieros y los
factores que reducen la misma, lo cual ocupa un lugar destacado entre los temas más importantes en el
contexto de la información financiera internacional.
©2020 ASEPUC. Publicado por EDITUM - Universidad de Murcia. Este es un artículo Open Access bajo la
licencia CC BY-NC-ND (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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1138-4891/©2020 ASEPUC. Published by EDITUM - Universidad de Murcia. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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1. Introduction
Complexity of financial reporting generally refers to the
complexity of explanatory language surrounding company’s
financial reporting (Guay et al., 2016). Based on processing
fluency theory from psychology (Hafner and Stapel, 2010;
Shah and Oppenheimer, 2007) and incomplete revelation hy-
pothesis from financial literature (Bloomfield, 2002), exist-
ing literature (e.g., Li, 2008; Guay et al., 2016; Lo et al.,
2017) argue that managers have incentives to increase the
complexity of financial reporting (complexity). To clarify,
since markets under-react to information that is too cognit-
ively difficult or costly to analyze, managers have incentives
to obfuscate poor performance, irregularities or bad news
by complicating the financial reporting through writing un-
necessarily long sentences and using complicated language
(Bloomfield, 2002; 2008). For this reason, in recent years,
securities commissions havemore closely monitored theman-
agers to reduce the complexity. For example, in the United
States of America, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) has devotedmajor resources in oversight processes and
has begun scrutinizing managers’ financial reporting beha-
vior (Lewis, 2012).
Theoretically, on the one hand, some prior research con-
cludes that securities commissions’ oversight is not effective
(La Porta et al., 2006; Djankov et al., 2008). For example,
La Porta et al. (2006) and Djankov et al. (2008) suggest
that a securities commission’s role is best in setting rules as
opposed to enforcing them. Therefore, the incremental ef-
fect of securities commissions’ oversight on the complexity
could not be significant. On the other hand, if the detection
of poor performance, irregularities or bad news is difficult
due to the complexity of a company, the securities commis-
sions could impose penalties against the company (Robinson
et al., 2011). To the extent that the current costs and future
costs—such as additional scrutiny by stakeholders—of these
penalties are sufficiently high, managers should reduce the
complexity. Thus, the securities commissions’ oversight may
reduce the complexity.
These evidences are raising the question of whether the
securities commissions’ oversight is beneficial, especially in
reducing complexity. Thus, our research question is that
whether securities commissions’ oversight reduces the com-
plexity. We theoretically discuss that securities commissions’
oversight may (1) increase the perceived cost of opportun-
istic behavior; (2) lead to additional scrutiny by auditors, in-
vestors and other stakeholders; (3) lead to negative outcome
for managers, (4) lead to demanding higher audit quality,
and (5) lead to better corporate performance. In these con-
ditions, managers/firms reduce the complexity.
Our research focuses on the financial reporting oversight
procedures provided by the Securities and Exchange Organ-
ization of Iran (SEO). The SEO regularly review financial re-
ports and it sends the company a comment letter and request
for managers to provide written responses and relative addi-
tional information. Thus, following past research (e.g. Cas-
sell et al., 2013; Cunningham et al., 2019), to measure the
securities commission oversight, we employ comment letters
from the SEO. Following prior research (e.g., Miller, 2010; Le-
havy et al., 2011; Guay et al., 2016; Cassell et al., 2019; Lo
et al., 2017; Dyer et al., 2017; Bozanic et al., 2019; Chen et
al., 2018; Chychyla et al., 2018), we measure the complexity
using the Fog index. To ensure that our findings are not attrib-
utable to general time trends in complexity, and to address
selection issues related to which companies are more likely
to oversight, we employ a difference-in-differences design
with a propensity score matching approach. Briefly, we com-
pare the Fog index, pre- and post- SEO comment letter re-
ceipt between the comment letter companies and matched
no-comment letter companies.
Our findings reveal that there is an inverse relationship
between the securities commission oversight and complexity.
In other words, our findings show that securities commission
oversight reduces the complexity. This finding is generally
consistent with the theoretical evidence indicating that the se-
curities commission oversight restricts the opportunistic ma-
nagerial behavior. Furthermore, our findings reveal that the
impact of securities commission oversight on the complex-
ity is stronger for firms that have high quality corporate gov-
ernance, as compared to firms that have low quality corpor-
ate governance. In supplemental analyses, we show that the
impact of securities commission oversight on the complexity,
(1) is not limited to one year and persists through at least
two years later; and (2) is not higher for firms that receive
multiple comment letters, as compared to firms that only re-
ceive one comment letter. We further show firms that did not
receive any comment letter tend to reduce their complexity
if the SEO has commented on their industry leader or close
rival.
Generally, since practitioners and academics in different
countries often focus on the oversight role in terms of eval-
uating its benefits and creating/reforming regulations, our
findings are important. Furthermore, since our study, in con-
trast to some prior studies (La Porta et al., 2006; Djankov
et al., 2008; Jackson and Roe, 2009), are based on explor-
ing the actual oversight activities undertaken by a securities
commission, the findings are probably more important.1
Regardless, our study contributes to two major streams of
research. First, it complements prior studies that examine
the consequences of securities commission oversight on fin-
ancial reporting quality. Therefore, (a) generally it provides
related evidence for the international debate on whether se-
curities commissions could provide beneficial effects. (b) Par-
ticularly, it provides evidence on the consequences of secur-
ities commission oversight in a (non-U.S. and) developing
capital market. Thus, this study contributes to the literat-
ure by extending the literature to a developing capital mar-
ket. To clarify the importance of this contribution, it is worth
mentioning that (1) to the best of the authors’ knowledge,
almost all of the studies on securities commission oversight
(comment letter observations) are from U.S capital market,
and therefore, generalizability of the studies to other cap-
ital markets, especially developing capital markets, is prob-
ably an open question. (2) Prior research suggest that in de-
veloping capital markets, relying on conventional corporate
governance mechanisms is not sufficient in reducing agency
conflicts and therefore finding other effective mechanisms is
very necessary. In this regard, our findings about the impact
of securities commission oversight on the managerial misbe-
havior and complexity would be very useful and extend the
literature on the effective corporate governance mechanisms
in developing capital markets.
Second, our study complements prior studies that examine
the factors that reduce complexity, which is the most import-
ant issues in the context of international business and finan-
cial reporting (KPMG, 2011). To clarify the importance of
this contribution, it is worth mentioning that recent literat-
ure (e.g. Guay et al., 2016) suggests that the complexity and
its related information processing costs are growing rapidly
1As Robinson et al. (2011) mentioned, there is little direct evidence
demonstrating the impact of securities commission oversight on the financial
reporting.
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and therefore it is very essential to find effective mechanisms
in reducing complexity.
2. Background and hypothesis development
As previously mentioned, this paper investigates whether
securities commission oversight reduces the complexity.
Hence, in this section, first, we start by reviewing the literat-
ure on complexity. Then, we briefly describe the SEO’s over-
sight process. Finally, we theoretically explain why we expect
securities commission oversight reduces the complexity.
2.1. Complexity
Processing fluency theory (Hafner and Stapel, 2010) sug-
gest that higher complexity reduces the ease with which
information is processed, namely processing fluency. This
lower processing fluency weakens information recipients’ be-
liefs about information reliability (Shah and Oppenheimer,
2007), leads to less favorable evaluations of the messenger
and reduces the ability to extract information (Oppenheimer,
2006).
In the context of financial reporting, these conditions in-
crease the information-processing costs. In this regard, in-
complete revelation hypothesis (Bloomfield, 2002; 2008)
suggests that information with higher processing costs drives
less trading interest and therefore less completely revealed by
market prices, resulting to less price efficiency and higher un-
certainty (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Kim and Verrecchia,
1991; Guay et al., 2016). That is why the securities commis-
sions have long voiced concerns about the complexity.
Particularly, in the context of managers’ financial report-
ing behavior, incomplete revelation hypothesis (Bloomfield,
2002; 2008; Li, 2008) predicts that to the extent that com-
plexity increases information-processing costs for investors,
managers can use complexity to obfuscate poor performance,
irregularities or bad news. For this reason, securities commis-
sions have more closely monitored the managers to reduce
the complexity.
Recently, the regulators concern over the complexity has
spawned a surge in empirical research investigating the com-
plexity. In financial literature, researchers often use the Fog
index as a measure of complexity (e.g., Miller, 2010; Lehavy
et al., 2011; Guay et al., 2016; Cassell et al., 2019; Lo et al.,
2017; Dyer et al., 2017; Bozanic et al., 2019; Chen et al.,
2018; Chychyla et al., 2018). The Fog index that was first
brought into the financial literature by Li (2008), is defined
as a linear combination of two metrics: average sentence
length and proportion of complex words.
In this regard, Li (2008) found a negative relationship
between profitability and complexity, concluding that man-
agers try to hide bad news by complicating the financial re-
porting. Further, Lo et al. (2017) find that firms most likely
to have managed earnings to beat the prior year’s earnings
have more complex reports. The current literature research
also displays that the higher complexity is associated with
lower forecast accuracy (Bozanic et al., 2019), fluctuation of
credit rating (Bonsall and Miller, 2017), increased idiosyn-
cratic volatility (e.g., Loughran and McDonald, 2016), lower
trading volume (Lawrence, 2013), and lower information ef-
ficiency (Lee 2012).
2.2. SEO’s oversight process
In Iran, the SEO has an oversight role of financial report-
ing through its review of company filings (Islamic Consultat-
ive Assembly, 2005). Generally, the SEO’s review process
is relatively comparable to the SEC review process, as the
key source to frame oversight process in Iran’s capital mar-
ket, is the SEC oversight process. The SEO selectively re-
views filings made under the Securities Market Act. The re-
views aim to increase transparency and expresses the SEO’s
willingness to discuss disclosure deficiencies with companies.
Much of these reviews involve evaluating the corporate repot-
ting from an investor’s view. If the reviews identify potential
deficiencies, the SEO sends the company a comment letter
seeking clarification, additional information, and oftentimes
revision of the filing or future filings. The initial comment
letter includes a request for managers to submit a written
response within ten business days or to propose an alternat-
ive time frame. The response of managers must include new
or additional disclosures in the financial reports. The SEO
consider response of managers and their new or additional
disclosures and then, may issue new comment letters until all
potential deficiencies are resolved. The review process varies
in duration to resolution and the number of rounds of formal
questions and answers between the SEO and the managers.
Ultimately, the process may terminate with the SEO recom-
mending the cases of financial reporting irregularities to the
process of regulatory enforcement and sanctions. Notable,
the potential sanctions on the information obfuscation are
very heavy for managers/firms and may include disqualific-
ation of managers, unlimited fines, or suspension of listing
(SEO, 2008).
2.3. Hypothesis development
Generally, as Johnston and Petacchi (2017) detailed, se-
curities commissions’ oversight role may avoid substantive
issues, thus creating no economic benefits. Since, for ex-
ample, given that public companies’ financial statements are
audited, it seems reasonable to question whether any signific-
ant benefit could arise from a securities commission review.
Unlike an audit, a review begins simply with the securities
commission staff reading the corporate filings. Moreover, reg-
ulated firmsmaymanipulate the agency regulating them (see
Dal Bo, 2006 for a review). Further, La Porta et al. (2006)
and Djankov et al. (2008) suggest that a regulator’s role is
best in setting rules as opposed to enforcing them. Never-
theless, the concerns of limited economic effect of securities
commissions’ oversight role may be offset by several factors
and therefore the economic impact of the role could be sub-
stantial. Since, for example, companies have the freedom
to select from differing auditor types, auditing is inherently
imperfect, and auditor incentive problems may magnify the
problem (Antle, 1982; Imhoff, 2003; Lawrence et al., 2013).
Further, the securities commissions’ oversight is institution-
ally the last line of defense in policing reporting quality, and
has the potential to compensate for both managerial misbe-
havior and audit weaknesses.
Particularly, theoretical evidence indicates that companies
decrease their complexity following the receipt of a comment
letter. Since, first, the receipt of a comment letter provides
a signal that SEO (as well as other supervisory mechanisms
such as board of directors or auditors) closely monitors the
company (Cunningham et al., 2019). This signal psychologic-
ally increases the perceived cost of opportunistic managerial
behavior (Cassell et al., 2019).2 The perceived cost of op-
2Consistent with signaling context (see Connelly et al. (2011) for details
about key concepts in signaling theory), how to do this monitoring is not
easily visible to managers/firms (Cassell et al., 2019). Thus, it is less likely
that managers anticipate how to do the monitoring and strategically respond
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portunistic managerial behavior will be sufficiently high be-
cause the close monitoring of the company may draw the
attention of regulator to other significant problem, and re-
veal new deficiencies (Brown et al., 2018; Francis, 2011).
Consequently, the increase in the perceived cost of opportun-
istic managerial behavior reduces opportunistic managerial
behavior (Rennekamp, 2012). For example, Bens and John-
ston (2009) provide evidence of the securities commissions’
oversight role in limiting earnings management through re-
structuring charges. Thus, managers less likely need to mask
the true consequences of their decisions (Cunningham et al.,
2019) and less likely need to complicate the relative reports
(Li, 2008).
Second, prior studies show that the receipt of a comment
letter provides significant signals to capital markets about fin-
ancial reporting (Skomra, 2018). These signals really lead
to additional scrutiny by auditors, institutional investors and
other stakeholders (Bens et al., 2016), because it affects “in-
formation asymmetries about latent and unobservable qual-
ity” (Connelly et al., 2010) of financial reports. For example,
Gietzmann and Pettinicchio (2014) suggest that auditors in-
corporate the signal from comment letter in determining the
client audit risk and increase their scrutiny and audit qual-
ity and adjust fees upwards in the period during which the
comment letter is received. This additional scrutiny, in ad-
ditional to restricting the opportunistic behavior, directly in-
creases the financial reporting precision and reduces com-
plexity (Johnston and Petacchi, 2017).
Third, prior studies show that the receipt of a comment
letter may lead to undesirable outcome for managers (Fran-
cis, 2011; Brown et al., 2018). For example, Gietzmann and
Isidro (2013) provides evidence that the receipt of a com-
ment letter serve as a negative signal of financial reporting
quality and find evidence that shareholder negatively react to
comment letter by sailing their shares. Further, Goldstein and
Sapra (2013) provide evidence that the receipt of a comment
letter causes market participants to impose “market discip-
line”. Therefore, managers attempt to find ways to improve
their reputation and image (Guay et al., 2016) or to reduce
market discipline (Duro et al., 2018). Under this situation,
they have stronger incentives to revive the lost trust and to
provide positive signals thought decreasing their opportun-
istic behavior. This decreasing opportunistic behavior may
increase the financial reporting quality and reduce the com-
plexity.3
Fourth, comment letters provide a valuable signal to man-
agers to demand higher quality audits. To clarify, as SEO re-
view is majorly performed on the audited financial reporting,
which is the joint product of management and auditors, man-
agers after taking corrective actionwill demand a higher qual-
ity work from their auditors to remediate issues addressed by
the SEO (Skomra, 2018), to avoid comment letters in the fu-
ture (Cassell et al., 2013), and to provide a positive signal to
the markets (Skomra, 2018). This higher quality audits, in
additional to restricting the opportunistic behavior, directly
increases the financial reporting precision and reduces com-
plexity (Johnston and Petacchi, 2017).
Fifth, the receipt of a comment letter may lead to better
corporate performance. To clarify, prior research (e.g., Chen
et al., 2007; Harford et al., 2017) shows that oversight pres-
sures provide a valuable signal to managers to exert greater
effort in managing the firm. Further, prior studies (e.g., Ber-
to the oversight intensity.
3For example, Chen (2015) finds that firms that receive a comment letter
are about 20%more likely to disclose foreign cash in the comment letter year,
compared to firms that do not receive a comment letter.
trand and Mullainathan, 2003; Baghdadi et al., 2018) argue
and find that the effort—rather than skill— is the real driver
of managerial and corporate performance. Thus, oversight
pressures may lead to greater effort and therefore higher cor-
porate performance. Similarly, receipt of a comment letter
as a sign of oversight pressures may provide a signal to man-
agers to exert greater effort and therefore improve corpor-
ate performance. Under this situation, managers not only
no longer need to/motivated to complicate the financial re-
ports, but also have stronger incentives to increase the trans-
parency and to reduce complexity (Li, 2008). As an alternat-
ive view, the receipt of a comment letter may decline corpor-
ate performance. To clarify, comment letters may lead to the
release of negative information that managers was withhold-
ing (e.g. Kothari et al., 2009), and therefore based on this
negative information, revised earnings could be declined. In
this situation, managers cannot easily complicate the finan-
cial reports as the securities commission directly reviews the
released negative information, and more importantly, man-
agers have lower need to complicate the financial reports as
the some part of negative information is revealed.4
Based on the theoretical discussion above, we state our
first hypothesis in the alternative form as follows:
H1: Companies reduce their complexity following the
receipt of a comment letter.
Theoretically, prior studies (e.g., GAO, 1991; Johnston and
Petacchi, 2017; Baugh et al., 2019) suggest that corporate
governance quality may affect the economic consequences
of securities commission oversight. Particularly, GAO (1991)
and Baugh et al. (2019) state that corporate governance is es-
sential for a successful regulatory oversight. This is because
higher corporate governance quality speeds up and improves
the corrective action of managers. For clarity, the higher
corporate governance quality may increase the negative out-
come of comment letters for managers resulting prompt ef-
fort from the managers to resolve the issues. Hence, the
higher corporate governance quality may speed up the cor-
rective action of managers (Mishkin, 1997) in response to
comment letters.
In addition, higher corporate governance quality may also
complement the securities commission oversight by incorpor-
ating the signal from comment letter in determining other
oversight process such as the oversight process of institu-
tional investors, directors, audit committees or external aud-
itors (GAO, 1991; Bens et al., 2016). Further, higher corpor-
ate governance quality may draw directors and auditors at-
tention to new major problems, and reveal new deficiencies
(e.g., Ryans, 2019; Brown et al., 2018). Thus, the higher cor-
porate governance quality may improve the corrective action
of managers (Mishkin, 1997) in response to comment letters
and beyond the scope of comment letters.
Based on the theoretical discussion above, we state our
second hypothesis in the alternative form as follows:
H2: The impact of comment letters on complexity is
stronger for firms having higher corporate governance
quality.
4Notable, under this alternative view, it is possible that managers exert
greater effort to compensate the reduced portion of performance. In this
respect, it is less likely that managers engage in opportunistic action, as they
are under direct the regulatory and other oversight.
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3. Research design
3.1. Measuring securities commission oversight and complexity
In this paper, we investigate whether and how securit-
ies commission oversight reduces the complexity. Thus, our
main independent variable is the securities commission over-
sight and our dependent variable is the complexity.
Following relevant studies (see for example, Cassell et al.,
2013; Kubick et al., 2016; Cassell et al., 2019; Cunningham
et al., 2019), we proxy for the securities commission over-
sight with SEO comment letter. Specifically, our measure of
securities commission oversight, CommentLetter, is a dicho-
tomous variable set equal to one if a firm receives an SEO
comment letter in year “t”, and zero otherwise.
Further, following the extensive recent literature (Guay et
al., 2016; Cassell et al., 2019; Lo et al., 2017; Dyer et al.,
2017; Bozanic et al., 2019; Chen et al., 2018; Chychyla et al.,
2018), we measure complexity using the Fog index. The Fog
index, developed by Robert Gunning, is a well-known and
simple formula for measuring complexity (Li, 2008). Assum-
ing that the text is well formed and logical, the Fog index cap-
tures text complexities as a function of sentence length plus
the intensity of complex words, (words with three or more
syllables). This sum is multiplied by 0.4 such that the Fog
index reflects the number of formal education years which
required to understand the text (e.g., Lo et al., 2017). Tech-
nically, for measuring complexity, we rely on calculation be-
low:
Fog = 0.4 × [number of words / number of sentences + 100
× (number of words with more than two syllables / number of
words)]
The FOG suggests that, ceteris paribus, texts having greater
average of words per sentence or percent of complex words
are more complex. The Fog index is widely used in social
science studies to investigate the relationship between the
complexity of written information and diverse outcomes or
decisions such as consumer drug use, consumer warranties,
medical error, mutual fund prospectuses, jury instructions,
and academic research prestige (Lehavy et al., 2011). This
index (or its components) is (are) usually used to measure
the complexity of English and non-English texts such as Span-
ish (e.g., San Norberto et al., 2014; Moreno and Casasola,
2015), French (e.g., Zurel, 2014), Persian (e.g., Kolahi and
Shirvani, 2012), and Korean (e.g., Jang and Rho, 2016) texts.
While the Fog index has limitations (Loughran and McDon-
ald, 2016), it has several important advantages. For example,
it allows the study of a large sample of firms, it provides an
objective measure, and it allows one to directly examine the
overall complexity of firms’ written narrative disclosures (Le-
havy et al., 2011), which is probably why recent studies often
use the Fog index as a measure of complexity constructs (see
for example, Guay et al., 2016; Cassell et al., 2019; Lo et
al., 2017; Dyer et al., 2017; Bozanic et al., 2019; Chen et al.,
2018; Chychyla et al., 2018).
To measure FOG, this paper focuses on financial statement
notes as a key component of financial reports (Lawrence,
2013). Following past studies (e.g., Lehavy et al., 2011; Lee,
2012), we exclude the non-text information and all sections
having more than 50% of non-alphabetic characters.5
5Since there is no accurate software to compute complexity for the Per-
sian language, our complexity computations are done manually by inde-
pendent contractors (independent from authors). Following Li (2008) we
randomly recomputed the complexity of 20 observations. The difference
between the results are lower than 3% (that is relatively lower than Li’s
5%), which confirm the high accuracy of the computations. Notably, al-
though the manual commutation generally provides some limitation, it also
Table 1
Descriptions of variables (alphabetic)
Variable  Description 
AEM The accrual earnings management computed exactly as in Ball and Shivakumar 
(2006) 
AudTenure Auditor tenure in years 
Age The number of years the firm has been listed on TSE 
Big A dichotomous variable coded 1 if the auditor is a big audit firm, and 0 else !CFO The standard deviation of cash flow from operations from year t−4 to year t, divided 
by  the average total assets 
Close rival A dichotomous variable coded 1 for firms with the closest total assets within their 
industry at the end of fiscal year t and 0 else; computed exactly as in Brown et al. 
(2018) 
Comment 
Letter 
A dichotomous variable coded 1 if the firm received an SEO comment letter in year t, 
and 0 else; computed exactly as in Cunningham et al. (2018) 
Complex 0.4×(average of words per sentence + percent of complex words) computed exactly 
as in Li (2008) 
Corporate 
governance 
quality 
The governance index determined following Lopes et al. (2016). Consequently, high 
(low) corporate governance quality refers to higher (lower) than median corporate 
governance quality.  
HVol Volatility of daily stock returns that is a dichotomous variable equals to 1 if the 
volatility of daily returns for the year is in the quartile four in year t, and 0 else 
Industry 
leader 
A dichotomous variable coded 1 for firms with at least 20% of the market share of 
sales within their industry in year t and 0 else; computed exactly as in Brown et al. 
(2018) 
Inst The percentage of shares owned by institutional investors 
MCap Natural logarithm  (shares outstanding at × the share price at the end of year) 
Loss A dichotomous variable coded 1 if earnings before extraordinary items is negative in 
year t 
M_Weak A dichotomous variable coded 1 if the audit reports is revealed an internal control 
weakness in year t and 0 else 
MTB Market value of equity plus total liabilities divided by total assets 
NegEarn Proportion of losses (negative earnings) for the company over year t−4 to year t.   
OperCycle Natural logarithm of the average trade receivables period plus the average 
stockholding period. The trade receivables period is 360/(Sales/Average trade 
receivables) and the stockholding period is 360/(Cost of goods sold/average 
inventory). 
Performance A portion of firm performance that is affected by managerial actions; computed exactly 
as in Demerjian et al. (2012) 
Post A dichotomous variable coded 1 in the year (and its following years) that a comment 
letter receipt, for both treatment group (99 comment letter observations) and 
matched control group (99 no-comment letter observations), and 0 else (for 198 
observations); computed exactly as in et al. (2018) 
REM The real earnings management computed exactly as in Roychowdhury (2006) 
Restate A dichotomous variable coded 1 if the company restate its financial statement in year t 
and 0 else 
ROA Income before extraordinary items divided by  total assets !Sale The standard deviation of sales revenues from year t−4 to year t, divided by  the 
average total assets 
Size Natural logarithm of total assets (Million Rials) 
Treatment-
ControlGroup 
  
A dichotomous variable coded 1 for treatment group (comment letter companies, i.e., 99 
comment letter observations ×2 year=198 observations), and 0 for control group (no-
comment letter companies, i.e., 99 matched no-comment letter observations ×2 year=198 
observations); computed exactly as in Cunningham et al. (2018) 
TEM The principal component of AEM and REM 
Zscore A dichotomous variable coded 1 if the company’s Z score is greater than median and 0 
else. Z score= [(1.4 × Retained earnings + Sales + 3.3 × Pre-tax income + 1.2 × 
(Current assets– Current liabilities)) ÷ Total assets] 
	
This table defines the main variables.
3.2. Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences design
The SEO may pay particular attention to certain types of
companies, and these companies will be reviewedmore often
than other companies. For example, because the oversight
consumes valuable resources, it is reasonable that securities
commissions apply a risk-based model to choose the compan-
ies for oversight each year (Cassell et al., 2019). Therefore, it
is probable that certain types of companies are more likely to
receive a comment letter. This issue suggests that there may
be systematic differences between companies that receive an
SEO comment letter and companies that do not.
Moreover, it is likely that complexity influenced by time
trends. For example, prior studies (e.g., Brown et al., 2018)
indicate securities commission oversight in a given year could
create a spillover or positive externality effect on other com-
panies in following years. If spillover results in changes to no-
comment letter companies’ behavior that better aligns with
the intent of requirements, the changes in complexity, go bey-
ond comment letter companies.
For these reasons, i.e., to address selection issues related
restricts other limitations. For example, the syllable count provided in Lin-
gua::EN::Fathom, a commonly used software for complexity commutations,
has approximately 10% inaccuracies (Ryan, 2016).
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to which companies are more likely to oversight and also
to ensure that our findings are not attributable to general
time trends in complexity; following prior studies (e.g., Esh-
leman et al., 2014; Shipman et al., 2017; Cunningham et al.,
2019; Johnston and Petacchi, 2017) we employ a difference-
in-differences design with a propensity score matching ap-
proach. Further clarification follows.
First, we identify all companies that receive a comment
letter in a given year t, and propensity-score match the com-
ment letter companies and no-comment letter companies,
using a one-to-one match and the nearest neighbor. We
propensity-score match following Cunningham et al. (2019).
A company’s propensity score is the probability of receiving
an SEO comment letter conditional on the company’s observ-
able criteria. Theoretically, our criteria include those identi-
fied by papers examining the determinants of the receipt of a
comment letter (Cassell et al., 2013; Johnston and Petacchi,
2017; and Cheng et al., 2014; Cunningham et al., 2019).
Technically, to generate propensity-score, we rely on the
estimation in Equation (1):
CommentLetterit = β0 + β1Complexit + β2AEMit+
β3REMit + β4M_Weakit + β5Restateit + β6HVolit
+ β7lnMCapit + β8Ageit + β9Lossit + β10Zscoreit+
Industry fixed effects + Year fixed effects + ϵit (1)
Where CommentLetter is a dichotomous variable set equal
to “one” (zero) for the company (not) received a comment
letter on the financial statements in year t; and Complex is
"0.4 × (average of words per sentence + percent of complex
words). Table 1 provides descriptions of all variables.
Following Eshleman et al. (2014), after obtaining the fit-
ted values from estimating Equation (1), we match each com-
ment letter company, to the no-comment letter company with
the closest fitted value in the same year and same industry.
Second, we compare the changes in complexity pre- and
post-comment letter receipt between the treatment group,
i.e., comment letter companies, and control group, i.e., no-
comment letter companies. To do this, we rely on the estim-
ation in Equation (2):
Complexi,t = γ0 + γ1 Treatment-ControlGroupi,t
+ γ2Posti,t + γ3(Treatment-ControlGroupi,t ×Posti,t)
+ γ4Size + γ5Sale+ γ6CFO + γ7NegEarn +
γ8OperCycle + γ9MTB + γ10ROA + γ11HVol +
γ12Age+ γ13Big + γ14AudTenure + γ15Inst + In-
dustry fixed effects + Firm fixed effects + µi,t (2)
Where Complex is as defined under Equation (1); and
Treatment-ControlGroup is set equal to one for the treatment
group — i.e., comment letter companies— and zero for the
control group— i.e., no-comment letter companies. The
coefficient of interest is γ3, which represents the differential
change in complexity between the treatment group and the
matched control group. Other variables are our control vari-
ables, that following earlier studies (e.g., Li 2008; Guay et al.,
2016; Lo et al., 2017; Cunningham et al., 2019) we expect
they affect complexity. Notable, to mitigate this concern that
complexity may be driven by firm fundamentals, rather than
managerial choices, following Francis et al. (2005),Hesarza-
deh and Bazrafshan (2018), and Hesarzadeh et al. (2019),
we use summary indicators of the firm’s fundamental as con-
trol variables.6 Table 1 provides descriptions of all variables.
6These variables are Size, σCFO, σSales, OperCycle, and NegEarn. In the
context of complexity, the indicators may indicate unique/unusual/difficult
circumstances of the business or operations (Daft and Macintosh, 1981),
which intrinsically requires more explanation via words or complex words,
could increase the complexity (Rennekamp, 2012).
Table 2
Sample selection procedures
 Observations 
All companies listed on the TSE from 2010 to 
2016 
2,219 
Financial or utility industry companies (966) 
Company-years with low trade levels  (503) 
Company-years with insufficient information (283) 
Final sample used for the Equation (1) 467 
  
Comment letter observations in a year t  [1] 99 
Propensity-score matched no-comment letter 
observations in a year t [2] 
99 
The aforementioned  (row [1]) comment letter 
companies in year t+1, i.e., after receiving 
comment letter [3] 
99 
The aforementioned (row [2]) no-comment letter 
companies in year t+1, i.e., after receiving 
comment letter [4] 
99 
Final sample used for the Equation (2) 396 
This table describes the sample selection procedure.  
 
Note for more clarification about the descriptions of some variables  
in Table 1: CommentLetter = 1 for [1], and  
CommentLetter = 0 for other (467-99 =) 368 observations. 
Treatment-ControlGroup = 1 for [1] & [3], and  
Treatment-ControlGroup = 0 for [2] & [4].  
Post = 1 for [3] & [4]; and Post = 0 for [1] & [2].  
	
Our second hypothesis predicts that the impact of com-
ment letters on complexity is stronger for firms having higher
corporate governance quality. To empirically examine this hy-
pothesis, consistent with the previous analysis in this section,
after estimation of Equation (1), we rely on the estimation of
Equation (2) for two groups of firm-years (subsamples): firm-
years having low corporate governance quality versus firm-
years having high corporate governance quality. To measure
corporate governance quality, following Lopes et al. (2016),
we scores the quality of corporate governance at the firm-year
level using 15 questions that cover four dimensions of cor-
porate governance, including board composition & perform-
ance; control & ownership structure; disclosure; and share-
holder rights (see questions 1 to 15 in Exhibit 1 of Lopes et
al. (2016)).
3.3. Sample and data
Table 2 describes our sample selection procedure. Our
sample consists of all companies listed on the Tehran Stock
Exchange (TSE) from 2010-2016, where the data on com-
ment letter is available for this research.7, 8 We obtain our
data from the Rahavard-e-Novin.9 Following prior studies
(e.g., Baghdadi et al., 2018; Demerjian et al., 2012), we ex-
clude all financial or utility industry companies due to the dis-
7The TSE is Iran’s largest capital market. For detailed information about
the TSE, refer to http://www.TSE.ir/.
8This paper begins in 2010, which is the third year after the SEO cre-
ates a division entitled “Division of Auditing and Financial Reporting”, for
review process. This action ensures that the review process in the division
is sufficiently stable.
9This database is the most comprehensive database in Iran’s capital mar-
ket. The complete version of this database includes financial reports and
capital market information. It also provides diverse capabilities for tech-
nical and fundamental analysis. Notably, all electronic copies of financial
statements are available on CODAL (at http://www.codal.ir) and the Centre
for Research, Development, and Islamic Studies (at http://www.rdis.ir/
CompaniesReports.asp). Moreover, capital market information is also avail-
able from the Tehran Securities Exchange Technology Management Com-
pany (at http://www.tsetmc.com).
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics for sample firms
Variables Mean Standard deviation 
First 
quartile Median 
Third 
quartile 
CommentLetter 0.210 0.408 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Complex 14.772 1.597 14.675 13.846 15.638 
AEM 0.000 0.097 0.005 -0.050 0.062 
REM 0.000 0.621 -0.030 -0.195 0.134 
M_Weak 0.089 0.285 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Restate 0.081 0.273 0.000 0.000 0.000 
HVol 0.246 0.431 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MCap 13.369 1.818 13.242 12.342 14.197 
Age 22.452 12.194 19.000 13.000 30.000 
Loss 0.108 0.311 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Zscore 0.510 0.500 1.000 0.000 1.000 
Size 14.028 1.942 13.830 12.936 14.643 !Sale 0.271 0.253 0.159 0.113 0.329 
CFO 0.131 0.154 0.086 0.062 0.136 
NegEarn 0.082 0.205 0.000 0.000 0.000 
OperCycle 5.658 0.523 5.687 5.429 5.992 
MTB 0.594 0.236 0.586 0.457 0.727 
ROA 0.148 0.165 0.139 0.066 0.221 
Big 0.257 0.437 0.000 0.000 1.000 
AudTenure 2.858 2.221 2.000 1.000 4.000 
Inst 72.107 24.299 79.740 64.240 90.390 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the main variables. 
The variable CommentLetter is a dichotomous variable coded 1 
if the firm received an SEO comment letter in year t, and 0 else. 
Complex equals 0.4×(average of words per sentence + percent 
of complex words). AEM is the accrual earnings management 
computed exactly as in Ball and Shivakumar (2006). REM is the 
real earnings management computed exactly as in 
Roychowdhury (2006). M_Weak is a dichotomous variable 
coded 1 if the audit reports is revealed an in-ternal control 
weakness in year t and 0 else. Restate is a dichotomous variable 
coded 1 if the company restates its financial statement in year t 
and 0 else. HVol is a dichotomous variable equals to 1 if the 
volatility of daily returns for the year is in the quartile four in 
year t, and 0 else. MCap is the Ln (shares outstanding at × the 
share price at the end of year). Age is the number of years the 
company is listed on TSE. Loss is the a dichotomous variable 
coded 1 if earnings before extraordinary items is negative in year 
t. Zscore is  a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the company’s 
Altman’s Z score computed exactly as in DeFond and Hung 
(2003) is higher than median and 0 else. Size is the Ln (total 
assets). !Sale is the standard deviation of sales revenues from 
year t−4 to year t, divided by the average total assets. CFO is the 
standard deviation of cash flow from operations from year t−4 
to year t, divided by the average total assets. NegEarn is the pro-
portion of losses (negative earnings) for the company over year 
t−4 to year t. OperCycle is the Ln (the average trade receivables 
period plus the average stockholding period). MTB is the Market 
value of equity plus total liabilities divided by total assets. ROA is 
the Income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. 
Big is a dichoto-mous variable coded 1 if the auditor is a big 
audit firm, and 0 else. AudTenure is the auditor tenure in years. 
Inst is the percentage of shares owned by institutional investors. 
	
similarity in the nature of the various metrics and the regula-
tions rendering the characteristics of their financial informa-
tion incomparable to those in other industries (Jiraporn et al.,
2009). Furthermore, we exclude observations without the
necessary data to compute our variables. These constraints
reduce our observations to 467. We use these observations
to estimate the Equation (1).
We obtain the comment letter data from the SEO’s Division
of Auditing and Financial Reporting. Consistent with prior
literature (e.g., Cunningham et al., 2019) and our research
question, we only consider the comment letters on financial
statements including 99-comment letters observations.10 As
previously mentioned, we propensity-score match these 99
observations to 99 no-comment letter companies, using a
one-to-one match and the nearest neighbor. Moreover, to
compare the changes in complexity of pre- and post-comment
letter receipt, we use the aforementioned 198 (99+ 99) com-
panies for the year following a comment letter receipt. This
procedure yields 396 observations. We use these observa-
tions to estimate the Equation (2).
It is worth stating that TSE setting are comparable to large
developing capital markets. To clarify, at a macro view, start-
ing in the late 1980s, similar to the large developing cap-
ital markets (see for example, Torre and Schmukler, 2006;
Chow et al., 2016; International Monetary Fund, 2016; Sub-
ramaniam et al., 2016) government of Iran implemented
macro stabilization programs and liberalized their financial
systems, leading to the proper market infrastructure and in-
stitutions for capital markets to flourish (Mashayekhi and
Mashayekh, 2008). Further, since the 2000s, similar to many
of the countries, government of Iran has reduced inflation,
brought external debts under control, and improved on most
of the key economic and social performance indexes. These
reforms gradually, for instance, increased the average ratio of
total market capitalization to Iran’s GDP to about 30% (TSE,
2016). At a micro view, comparable to most of large devel-
oping capital markets (see for example, Torre and Schmuk-
ler, 2006), the number of companies in capital market of
Iran is about 300 and these companies are characterized
by relatively high concentrated ownership structures. Over
the last decades, institutional investors have significantly in-
creased their participation in the Iran’s capital market and
consequently helped to create a more stable demand for se-
curities. In the context of financial reporting, a basis to
formulate some important regulations, such as regulations
on financial reporting (annual reporting, interim reporting,
M&D reporting, etc.) is large capital markets regulations,
such as U.S. capital market regulations. Moreover, in the
last three decades, Iran has employed international account-
ing/auditing standards — namely, “IASs/IFRSs” and “ISAs”—
as a basis for developing its national accounting standards.11
For this reason, the national accounting standards are sim-
ilar to the international accounting standards (Hesarzadeh
et al., 2019).12 Notable, (large) Iranian listed companies are
(required) permitted to apply international accounting stand-
ards since (2016) 2012 (IFRS Foundation, 2017).
10The other types of comment letters relate to cases such asmaterial news
disclosures, management earnings forecasts, registrations and prospectus
filings.
11Prior to 1990, financial reporting in Iran is influenced by Anglo-
American practices, tax- corporate law, and stock exchange regulations
(Mirshekari and Saudagaran, 2005).
12As a most important difference between national accounting standards
and international accounting standards, in Iran, some of investments (such
as investments in unquoted equity instruments) are measured at cost.
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Table 4
Correlation matrix
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
1- CommentLetter 1                     2-Complex 0.216 1                    
3-AEM 0.430 -0.009 1                   
4-REM 0.036 0.035 -0.122 1                  
5-M_Weak 0.369 0.045 0.037 0.039 1                 
6-Restate 0.402 0.005 -0.051 0.030 0.143 1                
7-HVol 0.044 0.002 -0.023 0.146 0.007 -0.047 1               
8-MCap 0.068 0.115 0.256 -0.216 0.000 0.017 0.057 1              
9-Age 0.058 0.082 0.012 0.079 -0.082 0.020 0.104 -0.030 1             
10-Loss -0.029 -0.071 -0.463 0.226 0.006 0.076 0.067 -0.263 0.003 1            
11-Zscore 0.027 -0.068 -0.266 0.160 0.044 0.004 0.096 -0.091 -0.089 0.257 1           
12-!Size 0.085 0.070 0.131 -0.138 0.052 0.011 0.085 0.658 -0.055 -0.115 0.134 1          
13-!Sale 0.018 0.021 0.006 0.102 -0.046 0.032 0.084 -0.004 0.050 -0.042 -0.066 0.015 1         
14-CFO 0.059 0.092 -0.061 -0.060 0.044 0.078 0.021 -0.089 -0.018 0.083 -0.090 0.053 0.095 1        
15-NegEarn -0.063 -0.094 -0.41 0.162 -0.045 0.039 -0.018 -0.262 -0.051 0.685 0.296 -0.196 -0.047 0.018 1       
16-OperCycle 0.091 0.058 -0.119 0.124 -0.046 0.095 0.035 -0.171 0.088 0.072 0.116 -0.081 0.005 0.066 0.040 1      
17-MTB -0.027 -0.013 -0.328 0.306 0.048 -0.036 0.072 -0.185 0.034 0.307 0.324 0.040 -0.025 0.063 0.188 0.028 1     
18-ROA -0.018 0.082 0.526 -0.307 -0.035 -0.049 -0.108 0.443 0.071 -0.527 -0.467 0.162 0.065 0.031 -0.574 -0.182 -0.374 1    
19-Big -0.065 -0.014 0.023 0.006 0.026 0.013 0.104 0.096 0.006 -0.025 0.084 0.180 0.128 -0.074 -0.053 -0.143 0.102 0.054 1   
20-AudTenure -0.029 -0.019 0.000 0.014 0.060 0.000 00.02 0.054 -0.031 0.037 0.031 0.050 0.005 -0.080 0.051 -0.092 0.032 -0.002 0.390 1  
21-Inst -0.006 0.159 0.086 -0.097 0.060 -0.047 0.033 0.205 -0.234 -0.129 0.104 0.221 -0.011 -0.109 -0.151 -0.097 -0.036 0.078 0.059 0.071 1 
This table presents Spearman correlations between the main variables. Bold denotes significant correlation coefficients at the 10%.  
The variable CommentLetter is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the firm received an SEO comment letter in year t, and 0 else. Complex equals 0.4×(average of words per 
sentence + percent of complex words). AEM is the accrual earnings management computed exactly as in Ball and Shivakumar (2006). REM is the real earnings management 
computed exactly as in Roychowdhury (2006). M_Weak is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the audit reports is revealed an internal control weakness in year t and 0 else 
Restate is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the company restates its financial statement in year t and 0 else. HVol is a dichotomous variable equals to 1 if the volatility of daily 
returns for the year is in the quartile four in year t, and 0 else. MCap is the Ln (shares outstanding at × the share price at the end of year). Age is the number of years the 
company is listed on TSE. Loss is the a dichotomous variable coded 1 if earnings before extraordinary items is negative in year t. Zscore is  a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the 
company’s Altman’s Z score computed exactly as in DeFond and Hung (2003) is higher than median and 0 else. Size is the Ln (total assets). !Sale is the standard deviation of 
sales revenues from year t−4 to year t, divided by the average total assets. CFO is the standard deviation of cash flow from operations from year t−4 to year t, divided by the 
average total assets. NegEarn is the proportion of losses (negative earnings) for the company over year t−4 to year t. OperCycle is the Ln (the average trade receivables period 
plus the average stockholding period). MTB is the Market value of equity plus total liabilities divided by total assets. ROA is the Income before extraordinary items divided by 
total assets. Big is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the auditor is a big audit firm, and 0 else, and 0 else. AudTenure is the auditor tenure in years. Inst is the percentage of 
shares owned by institutional investors. 
	
4. Findings
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 3 displays the basic features of main variables. Of the
sample of 467 observations, 21 percent (99 observations) re-
ceive a comment letter. The table displays that the average
of Complex is approximately 14.8 that is lower compared to
studies that examine the English version of financial state-
ments. For example, the average of Complex in Li (2008) and
Lo et al. (2017) is approximately 18 to 19, respectively. The-
oretically, this difference in the Complex is reasonable. Since,
in the Persian language, the length of sentence is 15% shorter
compared to English (KhazaeeFarid and Fathollahi, 2010).
Further, the operational environments of the companies in
our sample are less complex compared to the U.S. capital
market; therefore, as noted by Bloomfield (2008), lower com-
plex words suffice to convey information. Nevertheless, the
standard deviation of Complex is approximately 1.6, which is
close to that reported in the past research (see, for example,
Lo et al., 2017).
Table 4 presents correlation matrix for main variables.
Bold reflects statistical significant correlations at the 10%
level. The correlation of CommentLetter and Complex is posit-
ive (0.216) and significant, representing that the higher com-
plexity may associate higher comment letter. The correla-
tions of variables are lower than 60%, thus, multicollinearity
would not be a serious issue in our results. Untabulated VIF
scores are all less than 3 showing that multicollinearity is not
a serious issue.
4.2. Multivariate tests
As previously mentioned, our research design is based
on a difference-in-differences design. The difference-in-
differences design captures the change in the information
environment of the treatment group, i.e., comment letter
companies, relative to that of the matched control group,
i.e., no-comment letter companies. This approach controls
for changes that occur for reasons outside our scope of in-
terest, and thus, provides a better measure of the treat-
ment effect of comment letters. To perform difference-in-
differences analyses, using propensity score matching, we
match each of the comment letter companies to a com-
pany that does not receive a comment letter in the same
period. A company’s propensity score is the probability of
receiving an SEO comment letter conditional on the com-
pany’s observable criteria. We estimate each company’s
propensity score based on the Equation (1). Table 5 and
6 detail evidence on the propensity score matching. Spe-
cifically, Table 5 provides results from estimating Equation
(1). The results suggest that Complex (p-value=0.000),
AEM (p-value=0.028),M_Weak (p-value=0.000), Restate (p-
value=0.000), HVol (p-value=0.098), Age (p-value=0.015),
and Loss (p-value=0.035) generally have a significant effect
on CommentLetter. The explanatory power of variables is ap-
proximately 28%.
An important assumption of the difference-in-differences
methodology is that shocks contemporaneous with the com-
ment letters affect the treatment and control groups similarly
(Johnston and Petacchi, 2017). Table 6 provides evidence on
this concern. The table shows that the means for both treat-
ment and matched control groups. Briefly, paired sample t
test shows p-values are all bigger than 10% and thus the dif-
ference between means are insignificant indicating the effect-
iveness of matching process. Thus, the concern above is not
a significant issue.
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Table 5
Propensity-score matching model
Regression model: 
CommentLetterit = β0 + β1Complexit +β2AEMit+ β3REMit + β4M_Weakit 
+ β5Restateit + β6HVolit + β7lnMCapit + β8Ageit + β9Lossit + 
β10Zscoreit+ Industry fixed effects + Year fixed effects + εit  
Independent variable Exp. sign Coef p-value 
Complex + 0.499*** 0.000 
AEM  -3.609** 0.028 
REM + 0.162 0.170 
M_Weak + 2.987*** 0.000 
Restate + 3.362*** 0.000 
HVol + 0.442* 0.098 
MCap + 0.085 0.216 
Age + 0.029** 0.015 
Loss + -1.186** 0.035 
Zscore + 0.189 0.302 
Constant  -12.408*** 29.281 
Industry fixed effects Yes   
Year fixed effects Yes   
Observations 467   
Pseudo R Square 28%   
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. 
This table presents the logistic regression results of Equation (1) used for 
propensity score matching comment letter companies and no-comment 
letter companies. 
The variable CommentLetter is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the firm 
received an SEO comment letter in year t, and 0 else. Complex equals 
0.4×(average of words per sentence + percent of complex words). AEM is 
the accrual earnings management computed exactly as in Ball and 
Shivakumar (2006). REM is the real earnings management computed 
exactly as in Roychowdhury (2006). M_Weak is a dichotomous variable 
coded 1 if the audit reports is revealed an internal control weakness in 
year t and 0 else Restate is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the company 
restates its financial statement in year t and 0 else. HVol is a dichotomous 
variable equals to 1 if the volatility of daily returns for the year is in the 
quartile four in year t, and 0 else. MCap is the Ln (shares outstanding at × 
the share price at the end of year). Age is the number of years the 
company is listed on TSE. Loss is the a dichotomous variable coded 1 if 
earnings before extraordinary items is negative in year t. Zscore is  a 
dichotomous variable coded 1 if the company’s Altman’s Z score computed 
exactly as in DeFond and Hung (2003) is higher than median and 0 else.  
	4.2.1. Test of H1
In this section, we provide test of H1 that predicts com-
panies reduce their complexity following the receipt of an
SEO comment letter. For doing this test, we compare the
changes in complexity pre- and post-comment letter receipt
between the treatment group and control group; and rely on
the estimation in Equation (2). Table 7 presents our results.
The interaction of Treatment-ControlGroup and Post allows
us to determine whether the changes in Complex, following
the receipt of a comment letter, are different between the
treatment group and the control group. We find a signific-
ant (p-value = 0.005) and negative coefficient (-0.895) on
Treatment-ControlGroup×Post. This suggests that companies
reduce their complexity in the year receiving a comment let-
ter, consistent with our first hypothesis.
The coefficient on Post is negative (-0.302) and relatively
significant at 11% (p-value = 0.105), indicating that in the
year comment letter receipt, generally complexity is reduced.
This reduction may be results of spillover effect of SEO com-
ment letters. To clarify, Brown et al. (2018) show that com-
panies not receiving any comment letter modify their sub-
sequent year’s disclosures largely if the securities commis-
sion has commented on the disclosure of a close company.
In the section “Supplemental analyses”, we provide relevant
empirical evidence on the spillover effect of SEO comment let-
Table 6
Test of the difference in means between the matched pairs
Variable 
Comment letter 
companies 
Matched no-comment 
letter companies p-value 
Complex 14.882 14.630 0.157 
AEM 0.001 -0.015 0.143 
REM -0.035 0.082 0.108 
M_Weak 0.117 0.089 0.405 
Restate 0.092 0.096 0.900 
HVol 0.230 0.277 0.313 
MCap 13.466 13.315 0.454 
Age 22.847 22.523 0.474 
Loss 0.096 0.126 0.372 
Zscore 0.474 0.556 0.127 
Observations 99 99  
This table presents the results of the paired sample t tests for the 
matched sample of comment letter companies and no-comment letter 
companies.  
The variable Complex equals 0.4×(average of words per sentence + 
percent of complex words). AEM is the accrual earnings management 
computed exactly as in Ball and Shivakumar (2006). REM is the real 
earnings management computed exactly as in Roychowdhury (2006). 
M_Weak is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the audit reports is 
revealed an internal control weakness in year t and 0 else Restate is a 
dichotomous variable coded 1 if the company restates its financial 
statement in year t and 0 else. HVol is a dichotomous variable equals 
to 1 if the volatility of daily returns for the year is in the quartile four 
in year t, and 0 else. MCap is the Ln (shares outstanding at × the 
share price at the end of year). Age is the number of years the 
company is listed on TSE. Loss is the a dichotomous variable coded 1 if 
earnings before extraordinary items is negative in year t. Zscore is  a 
dichotomous variable coded 1 if the company’s Altman’s Z score 
computed exactly as in DeFond and Hung (2003) is higher than 
median and 0 else. 
 
	ters. On the control variables, generally, Size, σSale, σCFO,
OperCycle, Big, and Inst can statistically explain the complex-
ity. The explanatory power of variables is approximately 8%
that is comparable to prior relative studies (For example see
Li, 2008; Cunningham et al., 2019; Johnston and Petacchi,
2017).
Recent evidence suggests that complexity measures used
in the prior literature can be affected by underlying firm
performance (Loughran and McDonald, 2016; Guay et al.,
2016). Thus, as a sensitivity test, we re-estimate our
two primary analyses related to Complex, in Equations (1)
and (2), after replacing Complex with Complex _PM, a
performance-matched complexity. To construct Complex
_PM, wematch each Complexwith the closest firm-year obser-
vation return on assets (ROA) and within the same industry
as the benchmark. Further, we also use size and market
share as performance-matched benchmarks. Table 8 reports
the results. Briefly, the results show that there is a signific-
ant (p-value = 0.001; 0.003; 0.018) and negative coefficient
(-0.930; -0.0914; -0.871) on Treatment-ControlGroup×Post,
for all of performance-matched benchmark, i.e., ROA, Size,
and Market share. This suggests that Complex_PM is reduced
in the year receiving a comment letter. Thus, after replacing
Complex with Complex _PM, these results, similar to the main
results, indicate that companies reduce their complexity in
the year receiving a comment letter. As such, underlying firm
performance does not appear to have a significant influence
on the results in our study.
Our theoretical discussion about why we expect that se-
curities commission oversight reduces the complexity, ma-
jorly suggests that commission oversight may (1) restrict the
opportunistic managerial behavior; and (2) motivate man-
agers to exert greater effort and therefore improve firm per-
formance. In these conditions, managers no longer need
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Table 7
Difference-in-differences analysis for complexity 
Regression model: 
  Complexi,t = !0 + !1 Treatment-ControlGroupi,t + !2Posti,t + 
   !3(Treatment-ControlGroup i,t×Posti,t) + ! (Control) +      Industry fixed effects + Firm fixed effects + !i,t 
Independent variable Exp. sign Coef p-value 
Treatment-ControlGroup − 0.244 0.258 
Post − -0.302† 0.105 
Treatment-
ControlGroup×Post 
− -0.895*** 0.005 
Size + -0.082*** 0.000 !Sale + 0.495* 0.072 !CFO + 0.678† 0.145 
NegEarn + 0.236 0.326 
OperCycle + 0.196† 0.147 
MTB + 0.084 0.425 
ROA + 0.559 0.283 
HVol + -0.103 0.306 
Age + 0.001 0.456 
Big − 0.159** 0.025 
AudTenure − 0.000 0.498 
Inst + 0.011*** 0.002 
Constant  13.716*** 0.000 
    
Industry fixed effects Yes   
Firm fixed effects Yes   
Observations 396   
Adjusted R-squared 8%   
†p < 0.15;*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 
This table shows how comment letter receipt affects complexity. Specifically, 
this table presents the OLS regression results of Equation (2) using the 
difference-in-differences research design where each comment letter company 
is propensity-score matched with a no comment letter company in the same 
year, and all company years for t+1 are included in the model for both 
treatment and control groups.  
The variable Complex equals Complex equals 0.4×(average of words per 
sentence + percent of complex words). We set Treatment-ControlGroup 
equal to 1 for all company-years from the treatment group and Treatment-
ControlGroup equal to 0 for all company-years from the control group. Post is 
coded 1 for both the treatment group and the matched control group in the 
year following the receipt of a comment letter, and 0 else.  
The variable Size is the Ln (total assets). !Sale is the standard deviation of 
sales revenues from year t−4 to year t, divided by the average total assets. 
CFO is the standard deviation of cash flow from operations from year t−4 to 
year t, divided by the average total assets. NegEarn is the proportion of losses 
(negative earnings) for the company over year t−4 to year t. OperCycle is the 
Ln (the average trade receivables period plus the average stockholding 
period). MTB is the Market value of equity plus total liabilities divided by total 
assets. ROA is the Income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. 
Big is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the auditor is a big audit firm, and 0 
else. AudTenure is the auditor tenure in years. Inst is the percentage of shares 
owned by institutional investors. 
 
 
	
to/motivated to complicate the financial reports. In this sec-
tion, we directly examine the two aforementioned issues, i.e.,
whether the SEO’s oversight affects (1) the opportunistic ma-
nagerial behavior and (2) firm performance.
We proxy for the opportunistic managerial behavior with
total earnings management (TEM). In this regard, prior re-
cent studies demonstrate that companies can manage earn-
ings using two primary methods including accrual-based
earnings management (AEM), such as using “cookie jar”
reserves, and real activities-based earnings management
(REM), such as the opportunistic timing of discretionary ex-
penses (Cunningham et al., 2019). Prior research (e.g., Co-
hen at al. 2008; Zang 2012) provides evidence of a cost-
benefit trade-off between these two primarymethods. To cap-
ture both of the methods, we measure TEM thought aggreg-
ation of AEM and REM by statistical principal components
of AEM and REM. Then, to explore the effect of the securit-
ies commission oversight on TEM, following Cunningham et
al. (2019), we regress the TEM on independent variables in
Table 8
Difference-in-differences analysis for performance-matched complexity
Regression model: 
Complexi,t_PM = !0 + !1Treatment-ControlGroupi,t + !2Posti,t+ !3(Treatment-ControlGroup 
i,t×Posti,t) + ! (Control) + Industry fixed effects + Firm fixed effects + !i,t 
Performance-matched 
benchmark ROA Size Market share 
Independent variable Ex
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Treatment-ControlGroup i,t× 
Post 
− -0.930*** 0.001 − -0.914*** 0.003 − -0.871** 0.018 
Base variables Yes   Yes   Yes   
Control variables Yes   Yes   Yes   
Constant Yes   Yes   Yes   
Industry fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes   
Firm fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes   
Observations 396   396   396   
Adjusted R-squared 7%   7%   5%   
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. 
This table, similar to table 7, shows how comment letter receipt affects 
complexity. Specifically, this table presents the OLS regression results of 
Equation (2) after replacing Complex with Complex _PM, a performance-
matched Complex.  
To construct Complex _PM, we match each Complex with the closest firm-year 
observation “ROA/size/market share” within the same industry as a 
performance-matched criterion. We set Treatment-ControlGroup equal to 1 for 
all company-years from the treatment group and Treatment-ControlGroup equal 
to 0 for all company-years from the control group. Post is coded 1 for both the 
treatment group and the matched control group in the year following the receipt 
of a comment letter, and 0 else.  
Base variables are Treatment-ControlGroup and Post. All of other variables are 
the same as those in Equation (2) and Table 7 (Difference-in-differences analysis 
for complexity). 
Equation (2). Table 9 reports the results. The coefficient on
Treatment-ControlGroup×Post is negative (-0.247) and signi-
ficant (p-value = 0.005). Thus, briefly, the results indicate
that, as expected and consistent with prior research (e.g.,
Cunningham et al., 2019), managers reduce their misbeha-
vior following the receipt of an SEO comment letter. This find-
ing suggests that securities commission oversight restricts the
opportunistic managerial behavior.
We proxy for the firm performance (performance) with ma-
nagerial ability-score developed in Demerjian et al. (2012).13
This is because the score reflects a portion of firm perform-
ance that is affected by managerial effort. Following De-
merjian et al. (2012), we use a two-step process to estim-
ate the score. First, using data envelopment analysis, we es-
timate corporate efficiency by solving an optimization model
where sales is the output and there are seven inputs: net
property, plant, and equipment; net operating leases; net
R&D; purchased goodwill; other tangible assets; cost of in-
ventory; and selling, general and administrative expenses.
Second, since the corporate efficiency reflects both firm-level
as well as managerial effort, we separate the two by estim-
ating by industry, a regression of corporate efficiency on six
firm characteristics that affect corporate efficiency: firm size,
firm market share, cash availability, firm age, business seg-
ment concentration, and foreign operations. The residual
from this regression is our proxy of interest, performance. Fi-
nally, to explore the effect of the securities commission over-
sight on performance, we replace Complex with performance
in Equation (2). Table 10 reports the results. The coefficient
on Treatment-ControlGroup×Post is not significant (p-value=
0.273). Thus, briefly, the results indicate that the receipt of
an SEO comment letter does not influence the firm perform-
ance. Notable, the insignificant coefficient is not surprising.
This is because, as previously mentioned, on the one hand,
comment letter may force managers to exert greater effort
13Our main conclusion is not sensitive to use of simpler proxy of firm
performance, ROA or MTB.
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Table 9
Difference-in-differences analysis for opportunistic behavior
 
Regression model: 
TEMi,t = !0 + !1 Treatment-ControlGroupi,t + !2Posti,t + 
 !3(Treatment-ControlGroup i,t×Posti,t) + ! (Control) +  
Industry fixed effects + Firm fixed effects + !i,t 
Independent variable Exp. sign Coef p-value 
Treatment-ControlGroup×Post − -0.247*** 0.005 
Base variables Yes   
Control variables Yes   
Constant Yes   
Industry fixed effects Yes   
Firm fixed effects Yes   
Observations 396   
Adjusted R-squared 12%   
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. 
This table shows how comment letter receipt affects earnings 
management. Specifically, this table presents the OLS regression results 
of Equation (2) after replacing Complex with TEM, total earnings 
management.  
The variable TEM is the principal component of AEM and REM. AEM is 
the accrual earnings management computed exactly as in Ball and 
Shivakumar (2006). REM is the real earnings management computed 
exactly as in Roychowdhury (2006). We set Treatment-ControlGroup 
equal to 1 for all company-years from the treatment group and 
Treatment-ControlGroup equal to 0 for all company-years from the 
control group. Post is coded 1 for both the treatment group and the 
matched control group in the year following the receipt of a comment 
letter, and 0 else. 
Base variables are Treatment-ControlGroup and Post. All of other 
variables are the same as those in Equation (2) and Table 7 (Difference-
in-differences analysis for complexity). 
 
in managing the firm and therefore improving firm perform-
ance; and on the other hand, comment letter may reduce firm
performance if comment letters could result in the release
of negative information that managers was withholding (e.g.
Kothari, et al., 2009).
Regarding the two analyses above and to provide a more
casual analysis about the impact of SEO’s oversight on com-
plexity through the restriction of opportunistic managerial
behavior and improving firm performance, we follow Gow
et al. (2016) and employ a structural equation model-
ing approach. Figure 1 presents the structural model.14
Control variables are included in the model but not repor-
ted.15 As shown in the model, the path from Treatment-
ControlGroup×Post to TEM and also the path from TEM to
Complex is significant (p-values = 0.009 & 0.026). In addi-
tion, the coefficient in the former path is negative (-0.357)
representing that securities commission oversight restricts
the opportunistic managerial behavior. Further, the coeffi-
cient in the later path (1.902) is positive representing that
firms with lower opportunistic managerial behavior have
lower complexity. This point is consistent with Lo et al.
(2017) who show that firms with higher levels of earnings
management have financial reports that are more complex.
The path from Treatment-ControlGroup×Post to performance
is not significant (p-value= 0.426) that is consistent with
previous analysis. Further, the path from performance to
Complex is significant (p-value= 0.055) and its coefficient
(-0.247) is negative suggesting that better financial perform-
ance leads to lower complexity. This finding is comparable to
results of Li (2008) showing that the financial reports of firms
14Consistent with the so-called PLS path analysis with OLS, we use OLS
regression which is applied to each path.
15Notable, given to the structure of model, we exclude ROA and MTB
(which are reflecting performance) from control variables.
Table 10
Difference-in-differences analysis for firm performance
 
Regression model: 
Performancei,t = !0 + !1 Treatment-ControlGroupi,t + !2Posti,t + !3(Treatment-ControlGroup i,t×Posti,t) + ! (Control) + Industry 
fixed effects + Firm fixed effects + !i,t 
Independent variable Exp. sign Coef p-value 
Treatment-ControlGroup×Post ? -0.062 0.273 
Base variables Yes   
Control variables Yes   
Constant Yes   
Industry fixed effects Yes   
Firm fixed effects Yes   
Observations 396   
Adjusted R-squared 41%   
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. 
This table shows how comment letter receipt affects firm performance. 
Specifically, this table presents the OLS regression results of Equation (2) 
after replacing Complex with Performance, firm performance.  
The variable Performance is a portion of firm performance that is 
affected by managerial actions; computed exactly as in Demerjian et al. 
(2012). We set Treatment-ControlGroup equal to 1 for all company-
years from the treatment group and Treatment-ControlGroup equal to 0 
for all company-years from the control group. Post is coded 1 for both 
the treatment group and the matched control group in the year following 
the receipt of a comment letter, and 0 else. 
Base variables are Treatment-ControlGroup and Post. All of other 
variables are the same as those in Equation (2) and Table 7 (Difference-
in-differences analysis for complexity). 
 
 with lower earnings are more complex. Overall, the model
indicates that the association of SEO’s oversight and complex-
ity through the restriction of opportunistic managerial beha-
vior is negative (-0.357 × 1.902= -0.679) and significant.
However, the association of SEO’s oversight and complex-
ity through the changing firm performance is not significant.
Thus, the results suggest that securities commission oversight
significantly reduces the complexity through restriction of op-
portunistic managerial behavior.
4.2.2. Test of H2
Consistent with second hypothesis, we predict that the im-
pact of comment letters on complexity is stronger for firms
having higher corporate governance quality. To test this hy-
pothesis, we investigate the impact of corporate governance
quality, as captured by the governance index determined fol-
lowing Lopes et al. (2016), on the association of securities
commission oversight and complexity. Specifically, as previ-
ously mentioned, we estimate Equation (2) in two groups
of firm-years: firm-years having low quality corporate gov-
ernance versus firm-years having high quality corporate gov-
ernance.
Table 11 reports the results. We find significant coefficients
on Treatment-ControlGroup i,t×Post for both firms with high
quality corporate governance (p-value=0.002) and firms
with low quality corporate governance (p-value=0.011).
More importantly, there is significant different between the
coefficients on Treatment-ControlGroupt, for full sample (-
0.895), firms with high quality corporate governance (-
0.960) and firms with low quality corporate governance (-
0.704). Statistically, the untabulated F-test for the null hy-
pothesis of no difference in the coefficients on the aforemen-
tioned variables indicates that the difference between these
coefficients is significant at the 0.01 level. This suggests
that the complexity reduction is significantly greater for firms
that have high quality corporate governance, as compared to
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Figure 1
Causal diagram for the association of securities commission oversight and
complexity
Figure 1. Causal diagram for the association of securities commission oversight and complexity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 (parentheses reflect p-values).  
This diagram shows the mechanisms underlying the association between 
securities commission oversight and complexity. Specifically, this diagram 
shows whether comment letter receipt affects complexity (Complex) through 
restriction of opportunistic managerial behavior (TEM) and changing firm 
performance (Performance). Control variables are included in the model but 
not reported.   
We set Treatment-ControlGroup equal to 1 for all company-years from the 
treatment group and Treatment-ControlGroup equal to 0 for all company-
years from the control group. Post is coded 1 for both the treatment group and 
the matched control group in the year following the receipt of a comment 
letter, and 0 else. The variable TEM is the principal component of AEM and 
REM. AEM is the accrual earnings management computed exactly as in Ball 
and Shivakumar (2006). REM is the real earnings management computed 
exactly as in Roychowdhury (2006). Performance is a portion of firm 
performance that is affected by managerial actions computed exactly as in 
Demerjian et al. (2012). Complex equals 0.4×(average of words per sentence 
+ percent of complex words). 
All of other variables are the same as those in Equation (2) and Table 7 
(Difference-in-differences analysis for complexity). 
 
 
Treatment-ControlGroup i,t×Posti	 Complex	
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-0.357*** (0.009) 
 
	
1.902** (0.026) 
 
	
-0.030 (0.426) 
 
	
-0.247* (0.055) 
 
	
firms that have low quality corporate governance.
4.3. Supplemental analyses
In this section, we perform a number of tests to provide
greater understanding of association between securities com-
mission oversight and complexity. Specifically, we examine
(1) whether the companies’ awareness of increased scrutiny
from the SEO is limited to year t; (2) whether complexity re-
duction for both firms that receive more than one comment
letter and firms that only receive one comment letter are the
same; (3) whether spillover effect would occur if any industry
leader or a close rival received a comment letter. These ex-
aminations are as follows.
Theoretically, comment letter companies may anticipate
that their next review will occur some years later (Cunning-
ham et al., 2019), and therefore we expect to observe no
complexity reduction in year t+1 and t+2, for comment
letter companies. In this condition, the impact of com-
ment letters on complexity will be limited to just year t.
Thus, to determine whether the companies’ awareness of in-
creased scrutiny from the SEO is limited to year t, we re-
estimate Equations (1) and (2), after developing appropriate
additional variables of CommentLetter, Post and Treatment-
ControlGroup for year t-1 and t-2.16 The control variables
are the same as those in Equations (1) and (2), respect-
ively, and all variables are as previously defined. Table 12
reports the results. We find significant coefficients on both
Treatment-ControlGroupt-1 (p-value=0.005) and Treatment-
ControlGroupt-2 (p-value=0.006). Furthermore, there is not
significant different between the coefficients on Treatment-
16For example, CommentLettert-1, (CommentLettert-2) is an indicator vari-
able set equal to one if the company received a comment letter on the finan-
cial statements in year t-1 (year t-2), and zero otherwise.
Table 11
Difference-in-differences analysis for complexity: Firms with high and low
corporate governance quality
Regression model: 
Complexi,t = !0 + !1Treatment-ControlGroupi,t + !2Posti,t + !3(Treatment-ControlGroup 
i,t×Posti,t) + ! (Control) + Industry fixed effects + Firm fixed effects + !i,t 
 Full sample 
Firms with  
high corporate 
governance quality 
Firms with  
low corporate 
governance quality 
Independent variable Ex
p. 
sig
n 
Co
ef 
p-
va
lu
e 
Ex
p. 
sig
n 
Co
ef 
p-
va
lu
e 
Ex
p. 
sig
n 
Co
ef 
p-
va
lu
e 
Treatment-ControlGroup i,t× 
Post 
− -0.895*** 0.005 − -0.960*** 0.002 − -0.704** 0.011 
Base variables Yes   Yes   Yes   
Control variables Yes   Yes   Yes   
Constant Yes   Yes   Yes   
Industry fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes   
Firm fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes   
Observations 396   198   198   
Adjusted R-squared 8%   7%   6%   
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. 
This table shows the impact of comment letter receipt on complexity for firms 
with high corporate governance quality and for firms with low corporate 
governance quality. 
The variable Complex equals 0.4×(average of words per sentence + percent of 
complex words). We set Treatment-ControlGroup equal to 1 for all company-
years from the treatment group and Treatment-ControlGroup equal to 0 for all 
company-years from the control group. Post is coded 1 for both the treatment 
group and the matched control group in the year following the receipt of a 
comment letter, and 0 else. 
Base variables are Treatment-ControlGroup and Post. All of other variables are 
the same as those in Equation (2) and Table 7 (Difference-in-differences analysis 
for complexity). 
  
	ControlGroupt (-0.895), Treatment-ControlGroupt-1 (-0.899)
and Treatment-ControlGroupt-2 (-0.886). Statistically, the un-
tabulated F-test for the null hypothesis of no difference in the
coefficients on the aforementioned variables indicates that
the difference between these coefficients is not significant at
the 0.05 level. Collectively, these findings suggest that the
comment letters have an immediate impact in year t and the
impact persists through at least t+1 and t+2.
SEO may scrutinize some companies more frequently.
Hence, it is important to determine whether complexity re-
duction for both firms that receive more than one comment
letter (repeat-letter firms) and firms that only receive one
comment letter (i.e., single-letter firms) are the same. To
examine this issue, we re-estimate Equations (1) and (2),
after dividing our sample into the repeat-letter firms and the
single-letter firms. Table 13 reports the results. We find
significant coefficients on Treatment-ControlGroup i,t×Post
for both repeat-letter firms (p-value=0.004) and the single-
letter firms (p-value=0.005). More importantly, there is not
significant different between the coefficients on Treatment-
ControlGroupt, for full sample (-0.895), repeat-letter firms (-
0.913) and the single-letter firms (-0.891). Statistically, the
untabulated F -test for the null hypothesis of no difference
in the coefficients on the aforementioned variables indicates
that the difference between these coefficients is not signific-
ant at the 0.05 level. This suggests that the complexity reduc-
tion is not significantly greater for firms that receive multiple
comment letters, as compared to firms that only receive one
comment letter.
Theoretically, prior studies (e.g., Bratten et al., 2016;
Brown et al., 2018) suggest that no-comment letter firms
may pay attention to the comment letter correspondence
between the SEO and their industry peers and take a pre-
ventive action by improving financial reporting quality. Fol-
lowing the prior studies, we refer to this effect as “spillover
effect.” To determine whether in the context of complex-
ity, spillover effect would occur if any industry leader or a
close rival received a comment letter, we re-estimate Equa-
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Table 12
Difference-in-differences analysis for complexity: Timing of comment letter
receipt
Regression model: 
(1) Complexi,t = !0 + !1Treatment-ControlGroupi,t + !2Posti,t + !3(Treatment-ControlGroup i,t 
×Posti,t) + ! (Control) + Industry fixed effects + Firm fixed effects + !i,t 
(2) Complexi,t = !0 + !1Treatment-ControlGroupi,t-1 + !2Posti,t-1 + !3(Treatment-ControlGroup i,t-1 
×Posti,t-1) + ! (Control) + Industry fixed effects + Firm fixed effects + !i,t-1 
(3) Complexi,t = !0 + !1Treatment-ControlGroupi,t-2 + !2Posti,t-2 + !3(Treatment-ControlGroup i,t-2 
×Posti,t-2) + ! (Control) + Industry fixed effects + Firm fixed effects + !i,t-2 
 Regression Model (1) Year t 
Regression Model (2) 
Year t-1 
Regression Model (3) 
Year t-2 
Independent variable Ex
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Treatment-ControlGroup i,t× 
Post 
− -0.895*** 0.005 − -0.899*** 0.005 − -0.886** 0.006 
Base variables Yes   Yes   Yes   
Control variables Yes   Yes   Yes   
Constant Yes   Yes   Yes   
Industry fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes   
Firm fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes   
Observations 396   336   284   
Adjusted R-squared 8%   8%   7%   
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. 
This table shows how timing of comment letter receipt affects complexity. 
Specifically, this table presents the OLS regression results of Equation (2) and 
also OLS regression results of Equation (2) after replacing Posti,t with Posti,t-1 
and Posti,t-2.  
The variable Complex equals 0.4×(average of words per sentence + percent of 
complex words). We set Treatment-ControlGroup equal to 1 for all company-
years from the treatment group and Treatment-ControlGroup equal to 0 for all 
company-years from the control group. Post is coded 1 for both the treatment 
group and the matched control group in the year following the receipt of a 
comment letter, and 0 else. 
  
	tions (1) and (2), after developing appropriate additional
variables of CommentLetter, Post and Treatment-ControlGroup.
To clarify, for example, we exclude comment letter observa-
tions and re-structure our sample. Further, here, our treat-
ment group includes no-comment letter firms that their in-
dustry leader or close rival received an SEO comment and
control group includes propensity-score matched observa-
tions.17 In addition, Post is a dichotomous variable set equal
to one in the year (and its following years) that the industry
leader/close rival received an SEO comment, for both treat-
ment group and matched control group, and zero otherwise.
Table 14 reports the results. We find negative significant
coefficients on Treatment-ControlGroup i,t×Post for both firms
that their industry leader received an SEO comment (-0.105;
p-value=0.039) and firms that their close rival received an
SEO comment (-0.057; p-value=0.051). These findings sug-
gest that firms not receiving any comment letter reduce their
complexity if the securities commission has commented on
the industry leader or a close rival, indicating the comment
letters have spillover effect in year t. Notable, untabulated
findings reveal that the spillover effect persists (does not per-
sist) through year t+1 (t+2).
5. Conclusions
In recent years, securities commissions have long voiced
concerns about complexity (e.g., Lewis, 2012; Guay et al.,
2016). Consequently, they have more closely monitored the
managers to reduce the complexity. We investigate whether
securities commission oversight reduces the complexity. Con-
sistent with the theoretical predictions indicating that the se-
curities commission oversight restricts the opportunistic ma-
nagerial behavior (e.g., Bens and Johnston, 2009), we find
17Following Brown et al. (2018) we define the ‘industry leader’ as firms
with at least 20% of the market share of sales within their industry in year t
and , the ‘close rival’ as firmswith the closest total assets within their industry
at the end of fiscal year t.
Table 13
Difference-in-differences analysis for complexity: Repeat-letter firms and
single-letter firms
Regression model: 
Complexi,t = !0 + !1Treatment-ControlGroupi,t + !2Posti,t + !3(Treatment-ControlGroup 
i,t×Posti,t) + ! (Control) + Industry fixed effects + Firm fixed effects + !i,t  
 Full sample Repeat-letter firms Single-letter firms 
Independent variable Ex
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Treatment-ControlGroup i,t× 
Post 
− -0.895*** 0.005 − -0.913*** 0.004 − -0.891** 0.005 
Base variables Yes   Yes   Yes   
Control variables Yes   Yes   Yes   
Constant Yes   Yes   Yes   
Industry fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes   
Firm fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes   
Observations 396   104   292   
Adjusted R-squared 8%   6%   9%   
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. 
This table shows the impact of comment letter receipt on complexity for firms 
that receive more than one comment letter (repeat-letter firms) and firms that 
only receive one comment letter (i.e., single-letter firms). 
The variable Complex equals 0.4×(average of words per sentence + percent of 
complex words).We set Treatment-ControlGroup equal to 1 for all company-
years from the treatment group and Treatment-ControlGroup equal to 0 for all 
company-years from the control group. Post is coded 1 for both the treatment 
group and the matched control group in the year following the receipt of a 
comment letter, and 0 else. 
Base variables are Treatment-ControlGroup and Post. All of other variables are 
the same as those in Equation (2) and Table 7 (Difference-in-differences analysis 
for complexity). 
 
  
	
that securities commission oversight reduces the complexity.
Furthermore, we document that the impact of securities com-
mission oversight on the complexity is significantly higher for
firms that have higher corporate governance quality.
In addition, we document that the impact of securities com-
mission oversight on the complexity, (1) is not limited to one
year and persists through at least two years later; and (2)
is not significantly higher for firms that receive more com-
ment letters. These two points suggest that a single com-
ment letter is sufficient in reducing complexity, as opposed to
repeated warnings from securities commissions. We further
document the spillover effect of securities commission over-
sight, in the sense that firms not receiving any comment let-
ter reduce their complexity if the securities commission has
commented on the industry leader or a close rival. Thus, our
results, comparable to Brown et al. (2018), reveal the ex-
ternalities of securities commission oversight in the context
of complexity.
In general, this paper documents a beneficial effect of
the securities commissions’ oversight in reducing complexity.
Thus, on the one hand, our results provide related evidence
for the international debate on whether securities commis-
sions could provide beneficial effects. On the other hand, our
results contribute the literature on the complexity and its re-
ducing factors that are among most important issues in the
context of international financial reporting.
The results have policy and practical implications. To cla-
rify, for example, as previously mentioned, in developing cap-
ital markets, relying on conventional corporate governance
mechanisms is not sufficient in reducing different agency
conflicts and therefore, it is very essential to find effective
mechanisms. In this regard, our findings introduce an ef-
fective mechanism — i.e., improving securities commission
oversight — to reduce managerial misbehavior and complex-
ity in developing capital markets. In addition, since our res-
ults show that the impact of securities commission oversight
is higher for firms that have higher corporate governance
quality, it seems the securities commissions, boards of dir-
ectors and capital market participants could increase the ef-
fectiveness of securities commission oversight by increasing
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Table 14
Difference-in-differences analysis for complexity: Spillover effect of
securities commission oversight
Regression model: 
Complexi,t = !0 + !1Treatment-ControlGroupi,t + !2Posti,t + !3(Treatment-ControlGroup 
i,t×Posti,t) + ! (Control) + Industry fixed effects + Firm fixed effects + !i,t 
 Main (Full) sample Spillover effect sample 
  Industry leader Close rival 
Independent variable Ex
p. 
sig
n 
Co
ef 
p-
va
lu
e 
Ex
p. 
sig
n 
Co
ef 
p-
va
lu
e 
Ex
p. 
sig
n 
Co
ef 
p-
va
lu
e 
Treatment-ControlGroup i,t× 
Post 
− -0.895*** 0.005 − -0.105** 0.039 − -0.057* 0.051 
Base variables Yes   Yes   Yes   
Control variables Yes   Yes   Yes   
Constant Yes   Yes   Yes   
Industry fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes   
Firm fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes   
Observations 396   160   216   
Adjusted R-squared 8%   6%   8%   
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. 
This table shows the spillover effect of securities commission oversight. Spillover 
effect sample includes no-comment letter firms that their industry leader or close 
rival received an SEO comment and propensity-score matched observations. 
Consequently, Treatment-ControlGroup is a dichotomous variable coded 1 for 
treatment group (no-comment letter firms that their industry leader/close rival 
received an SEO comment), and 0 for control group (matched no-comment letter 
observations). Further, Post is a dichotomous variable coded 1 in the year (and its 
following years) that the industry leader/close rival received an SEO comment, for 
both treatment group and matched control group, and 0 else. We define the 
‘industry leader’ as firms with at least 20% of the market share of sales within their 
industry in year t and , the ‘close rival’ as firms with the closest total assets within 
their industry at the end of fiscal year t. The variable Complex equals 
0.4×(average of words per sentence + percent of complex words). 
Base variables are Treatment-ControlGroup and Post. All of other variables are 
the same as those in Equation (2) and Table 7 (Difference-in-differences analysis 
for complexity). 
  
	the corporate governance quality. Moreover, our results indic-
ate that the impact of securities commission oversight on the
complexity persists through at least three years and also is not
higher for firms that receive more comment letters. Hence,
the results provide insights for the concerns about resource
constraint— that is a central challenge for securities commis-
sions (e.g., Ege et al., 2018)— and suggest that the securities
commissions could mitigate their resource constraints in the
current period by delaying the periodic reviews of some firms
that received a comment letter over the past year.
This study still has limitations. A major limitation is that
this paper uses Fog index to measure securities commission
oversight. While the index is the most common measure of
complexity and the association of this index and the diverse
financial variables are documented in the extensive prior re-
search (Guay et al., 2016; Cassell et al., 2019; Lo et al., 2017;
Dyer et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2018; Chychyla et al., 2018),
as Loughran and McDonald (2016) discuss, it may contain a
significant measurement error. Hence, readers need to exer-
cise some caution when they attempt to use the findings.
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